Using microdata from the IBRE-FGV Consumer Survey we investigate if Brazilian consumers form expectations consistent with the Taylor rule and if the consistency changes according to the monetary policy conducted by the Central Bank of Brazil.
Introduction
The anchoring of expectations has a fundamental role for monetary policy efficiency.
Individual's expectations about macroeconomic variables affect consumption and savings decisions and thus influence price and salary dynamics in the economy. As a result, we find that the Brazilian consumer can perceive the right relationship between interest rates and inflation within the rule's framework, but the same is not true for the relationship between interest rates and unemployment. However, this second case does not necessarily represents a misunderstanding, because the unemployment rate didn't varied in a cyclical manner during the period and also because of lessor attention given to this variable in the strict inflation targeting regime pursued by the BCB. In a similar analysis, Carvalho and Nechio (2014) test if the American consumer understands the basic principles underlying the Taylor rule using a reduced form non-parametric approach. The application of their methodology for the Brazilian consumer lead to the same results described above.
Ideally, a coherent central bank would have more facility in promoting an environment with anchored expectations where shocks to the economy would dissipate in the long run, but conduct deviations would affect agents understanding. We also show evidence that consumer understanding about the monetary policy has changed during the 2011 easing cycle, probably because of the monetary policy shift to a more dovish stance.
In comparison to the work of Carvalho and Nechio (2014) , this paper is more focused on the consistency of expectations according to the monetary policy conduction in Brazil, with an additional motivation that the BCB was more dovish than the Federal Reserve during the period considered. Thus, our results lead to evidence that central bank deviations on that period could have contributed to their recent loss of credibility.
Winning credibility requires a more transparent and informative communication strategy about monetary policy decisions. Despite no consensus regarding an optimal communication strategy, the improving of communication pursued by several central banks around the world has been fostering positive effects like more predictability, less market volatility, and a more stable inflation environment (Blinder et al.,2008) . However, more attention has been given to financial market agents. This paper attempts to give more focus to consumer expectations. Besides the important role they played in price determinacy on the economy, they politically legitimize the autonomy of the central bank through the democratic process.
More transparency, thus, reflects the compromise with accountability (Yellen, 2015) . Therefore, our approach also is an important evaluation of BCB's communication and credibility accomplishment with the people.
Our analysis assumes the Taylor rule as the usual monetary policy framework implemented by the central banks. The adoption of a monetary policy rule based on a target for the policy rate became a standard practice after the seminal work of Taylor (1993) that specifies the interest rate as a function of price and activity variations. To understand this relationship in a dual mandate context 1 means to be consistent with the Taylor rule, definition that will be discussed more carefully throughout the paper. However, it's important to consider that this vision has some limitations because monetary policy decisions depend on many other factors besides the current inflation and the output gap, as specified by the simple Taylor rule (Svensson, 2003) .
In Brazil it's adopted the strict inflation targeting regime, implemented in 1999.
Since then, this regime has contributed to price stability, because in spite of some inflationary shocks in the period, inflation remained constantly within the target limits.
2 However, some conduct deviations of the BCB has been noted in the period.
1 Some countries adopted the inflation targeting regime, where the monetary authority's main objective is to secure the purchasing power of the currency, which would be considered as a single mandate, or strict inflation targeting. After the crisis, the financial stability objective has also become relevant, characterizing a kind of "triple" mandate. These cases can be considered as variations of the basic formulation of the rule introduced by Taylor (1993) . Balbino, Colla and Teles (2011) In his inaugural speech, Alexandre Tombini said: "Adopted more than 11 years ago, the inflation targeting regime has unquestionable success in achieving its main goal of coordinating society's expectations..." (Tombini, 2011) .
For a number of years the monetary policy expectations literature has expanded and started to cover different issues, but little attention has been given to the consumers. The poor predictive power of households about macroeconomic variables, due to information rigidity and rational inattention, as well as the greater concern with the expectations of price and wage-setters agents are possible explanations. On the one hand, some studies focused more attention on financial market analysts. Mitchell and Pearce (2009) and Carvalho and Minella (2012) Carroll (2003) proposes a model in which agents update their expectations with a certain probability based on financial market forecasts released in the media. The reason for this is the assumption that consumers rationally believe that market professionals make much more accurate forecasts, but update their expectations only occasionally when they read newspapers. Thus, the model is able to explain several features of the data that rational expectations models cannot.
Another part of the literature focused on consumer expectations about specific macroeconomic variables. Mankiw et al. (2004) demonstrate that agents disagree with each other about expected future inflation and this can be translated by a simple "sticky-information" model. Souleles (2004) discusses the main characteristics of American consumer forecasts about different macro variables. Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) show that information rigidity affects agents'
forecasts about the economy and causes delays in the response of expectations to shocks. For this reason, the authors emphasize that informational frictions should be incorporated into macroeconomic models. In turn, Preston (2006) focuses attention on the importance of private agents' forecasts for monetary policy design. According to the author, if the central bank does not correctly understand the learning mechanism of private agents, the usual rules of monetary policy based on expectations can lead to divergences of learning and thereby create obstacles to the stability of economic fluctuations.
As mentioned earlier, our work is more related to the literature that uses survey data to measure the consistency of expectations about macroeconomic concepts, as Carvalho and Nechio (2014) for the United States. Drager et al. (2013) extend the approach using the Michigan Survey to check if the American consumer comprehends the basic principles of the Phillips Curve and the Fisher's Equation.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the
Consumer Survey data used to analyze consumer forecasts for selected macroeconomic variables. Section 3 introduces the analysis of consistency of expectations and the empirical method used to evaluate the public's understanding about monetary policy. Next, Section 4 assesses consumer expectations according to the behavior of the central bank in the period. The last section concludes.
Data
The on the National Broad Consumer Price Index (IPCA), the indicator used for the inflation target.
Regarding the interest rate question, we are assuming an association with the Selic rate used by the BCB as the monetary policy instrument. One can argue that consumers are more sensitive to credit rates, but we observe that the banking spread, calculated using the Selic as the funding rate and the non-earmarked consumer credit rates of the BCB 5 , remained fairly constant in the period of interest, despite a slight downward trend.
6
As already mentioned, we are not interested in evaluating the quality of people's forecasts, since a non-specialist is not always willing to incur the costs of acquiring information about the economic situation, a phenomenon also known as rational inattention, and therefore estimates of specific variables become imprecise.
Thus, our analysis focuses on the direction of forecasts, and for this reason we will construct a categorical variable for inflation expectations that symbolizes increase, maintenance or fall. One can also suppose that the individual applies some rounding procedure when answering about the expected direction of a certain variable.
We then construct approximation intervals of 0.2 and 0.5 percentage points in the construction of the categorical variable. That is, if the difference between forecasted and real inflation is within the range (-0.2, 0.2) or (-0.5,0.5), in percentage points, we consider that the household is forecasting no change in the variable. 6 However, it is important to note that despite the constant spread, the different interest rates in the market to which each individual is exposed adds an idiosyncratic noise to this analysis, which may disrupt the estimates. It is also expected that consumer's forecasts will be influenced by both the current inflation and expert forecasts, usually through the media, as proposed by Carroll (2003) . Figure 1 shows this can be true for inflation expectations, the only quantitative question of the Survey. In other words, the average inflation forecast of consumers and market experts 8 for the next 12 months shows a strong correlation with current inflation accumulated in 12 months up to the month observed, indicating that when forecasting future price changes households attribute a lot of weight to its current value, a kind of adaptive learning.
9
Moreover, since consumer's forecasts always exceed the real data, they appear to observe an inflation rate that is higher than its current value. 10 As we will construct the categorical variable based on realized inflation, this phenomenon can overestimate expectations of price increases. In Appendix A.2 we construct the 8 Median market expectations collected weekly by BCB's Focus survey, based on about 100
economists and financial market professionals and consulting firms.
9 To test this hypothesis, we performed a simple regression of the inflation expectation as a dependent variable and the inflation, interest rates, the unemployment rate, the expectations about the future variation of interest rate and unemployment as regressors. However, the null hypothesis of the joint test in which all coefficients are non-significant, with the exception of past inflation, was rejected suggesting that the hypothesis of strict adaptive expectations is not confirmed for Brazilian consumers, despite the high weight obtained for this coefficient.
10 The average and median forecast of the public for the entire period of analysis was 7.75% and 6%, respectively, while the average annual variation of the IPCA was 5.25%. analyze the difference between proportions of the variables increasing and decreasing in a given 6-month period, which we call the "interest rate differential" and "labor differential", together with the Selic rate and the unemployment rate at the same time. Again, it seems that the individual relies on the present to predict the future, since the differential increases in moments of increases in the realized data.
The graphs also show that some movements in expectations seem to occur before the actual data. To verify this hypothesis, we performed Granger causality tests between expectations and realized data and the results presented in Appendix A.1
show that consumers are good predictors of the variables considered. We also analyze consistency according to sociodemographic characteristics of our sample. The survey divides individuals according to four levels of monthly income:
up to R$ 2,100, between R$ 2,100 and R$ 4,800, between R$ 4,800 and R$ 9,600
and above R$ 9,600. Five education levels: uneducated, full primary, middle school, high school, senior and postgraduate; besides sex and age divisions. However, as we will see in the next section, the results are homogeneous between levels.
Consistency with the Taylor rule
We will then proceed to the consistency analysis. In this section we evaluate whether
Brazilian consumers form expectations consistent with the Taylor rule. As already mentioned, being consistent with the Taylor rule means understanding the causal relationship of changes in inflation and output on the interest rate. Thus, if an individual forecasts rising inflation and falling unemployment, to be consistent in a Taylor sense they should forecast increases in the interest rate, and vice versa.
It is important to consider that not being consistent with the Taylor rule does not mean misunderstanding the monetary policy adopted. The public's understanding of monetary policy is based both on the theoretical understanding of the rule framework and on the actions of the central bank given the surrounding environment. For this reason, in the next section we will also verify if there are changes in the formation of expectations according to the actions of the monetary authority. Table 2 shows forecasts of the interest rate conditional on inflation and unemployment forecasts, according to the Consumer Survey. 11 Each line brings the frequencies of such forecasts, i.e., F(i|π ↑, u ↓) indicates that among the consumers who predicted rising inflation and falling unemployment, 32% predicted an increase in interest rates, 45% a maintenance and 23% a drop. The data columns show the behavior of the central bank using the Selic rate in the months in which inflation and the unemployment rate followed the specified direction. 12 As we see, regardless of the other variables' forecasts, the great majority of households forecast maintenance of the interest rate, as shown in Table 1 , in most cases not obeying the Taylor rule.
However, the realized data is more consistent with the rule, especially in cases of falling inflation. In the last two lines, for example, we see an indication that the BCB was consistent in all periods in which the rule recommended reducing interest rates, corresponding to 19 months of our sample. 
OLS in expectations
The frequencies in Table 2 , while indicating a certain inconsistency of the public, do not allow us a very accurate conclusion. To verify empirically if household's expectations follow a Taylor rule we estimate the following Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, with fixed effects at the individual level 13 :
where Et(∆it,t+6), Et(∆πt,t+12) and Et(∆ut,t+6) pool all household's forecasts in time t with the direction of the expected change in interest rate, inflation and unemployment, respectively, and ε is the error term. The direction of expected changes of 12 In this case, the categorical variable of inflation was constructed for 6-months ahead to suit the variation of interest rate and unemployment.
13 Cluster-robust standard errors also at the individual level.
inflation was calculated as the difference between the forecasted inflation 12-month ahead and the IPCA at the time of the answer, rounding off by 0.2 percentage points. We also estimate equation (1) incorporating only the numerical inflation forecast Et(πt+12), as well as the difference between the 12-month inflation forecast and the median forecast of each household Et(∆πM,t+12). The results are shown in Table 3 . We can observe that inflation expectations have a positive and significant effect on interest rate forecasts, even when we consider the numerical forecast and the difference between realized inflation and the median individual forecast, a result that is consistent with the principles underlying the Taylor rule. On the other hand, the sign of the effect of unemployment expectations follows the same direction, not obeying the rule.
One possible explanation for this is that the BCB follows a strict inflation targeting regime, which can cause people to understand only the policy response to price
changes. In addition, during the period considered we observed a certain dissociation of the unemployment rate from GDP growth in Brazil. In the years considered unemployment was characterized by successive falls and a not cyclical variation, immune to shocks that affected the Brazilian economy, which spoils this type of analysis. For these reasons, the last two columns show the estimation without the unemployment expectation as a regressor, and we see that the relationship between interest rates and inflation forecasts remains the same.
We also estimate (1) separated by levels of income and education. We analyze expectations of individuals with income below R$ 2.100 and above R$ 9.600, as well as individuals with education up to college and those who have at least a college degree. The results in Tables 4 and 5 show little heterogeneity in the consistency of expectations by demographics. Despite some differences in magnitude between the groups, both inflation and unemployment expectations have a positive and significant effect on interest rate forecasts. Thus, we cannot conclude that more educated or higher-income individuals better understand the Taylor rule than the others, and all groups present "inconsistency" in unemployment expectations in the rule framework (positive coefficient). cluster-robust standard errors in parenthesis ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Carvalho and Nechio (2014): Partial Effects
Alternatively, we use the approach of Carvalho and Nechio (2014) to verify if the previous results maintain. The authors propose a particular method to test whether consumers understand the basic principles underlying the Taylor rule. Based on the conditional frequencies of consumer forecasts presented in Table 2 , the partial effects of inflation and unemployment are defined below, and we set up a one-sided test where the null hypothesis is the inequality that violates the basic principles underlying the Taylor rule. Therefore, rejection of the null hypothesis leads to
evidence that the partial effect tested follows the rule.
The advantage of this method is that considering only the specified conditional distribution allows asymmetries in responses in relation to cases not considered. In this way, we can better analyze whether partial effects obey the rule by focusing only on a specific case, each of the inequalities below.
Partial Effects of Inflation:
Partial Effects of Unemployment:
In Table 6 we can see that the partial effects of inflation conform with the principles underlying the Taylor rule for the realized data in most cases, since we reject the null hypothesis in three of the four cases at a 5% significance level.
14 The partial effects of unemployment violate Taylor's rule in two cases in which the null hypothesis is not rejected. 
Partial Effects of Unemployment null hypothesis mean diff. p-value
Regarding the Consumer Survey, Table 7 shows that all partial effects of inflation follow the principles of the Taylor rule and are statistically significant at the usual levels. This means that the average public consistency, according to the specified inequality, is higher in cases that obey the rule. On the other hand, the partial effects of unemployment move in the opposite direction. In all cases we do not reject the null hypothesis, or do not follow the rule. The same conclusion can be made when we use the individual median for constructing the inflation forecast variable, as shown in Table 17 in Appendix A.2. 
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Our results were similar to those found by the authors for the American consumer. The Brazilian consumer seems to understand the relationship between inflation and interest rate within the framework of the Taylor rule, but does not seem to understand the relationship between unemployment and interest rate, a result that may have been influenced by the evolution of the unemployment rate series in the period and by the single mandate adopted by the BCB, as mentioned previously.
We also consider the estimates by the cycle of the unemployment rate, as the authors do. We construct the unemployment gap as a measure of economic slack with the Hodrick-Prescott Filter in the unemployment rate, and we estimate the Brazilian Review of Econometrics 37(2) November 2017 partial effects for the periods when the gap is positive and negative. In this case, unlike the American case, the perception of Brazilians in this approach does not change within the economic cycle. 
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Consistency Specifications
However, one can say that if we change the directions of each variable in Table 2 it can misguide interpretations. In an economy with rising inflation and output, for example, a central bank that chooses to increase interest rates is not necessarily inconsistent, given its set of information and the outlook for the future of the economy. Theoretically, the optimal monetary policy would be characterized by a central bank that exerts such volatility in determining the interest rate as necessary to keep inflation and the level of employment in equilibrium. To better analyze these different possibilities, we define three specifications according to expected directions of each variable in the Taylor sense. The specifications are sums of each response frequency from the microdata. At the end, each measure will be an average proportion of all answers specified under total answers. The first measure follows Drager et al. (2013) , described above, which we call Specification 1, and the other two incorporate more cases to this one. Specification 2 considers cases in which interest rates follow opposite directions to unemployment as proposed by the rule, and Specification 3 adds cases of "inconsistency" for inflation or unemployment, separately, at times of constant interest rates: Figure 4 shows that the three specifications present similar patterns in the analyzed period, and the more cases we incorporate the higher the consistency level. Specification 3 oscillates around an average of 60% of total responses in the considered period, indicating a reasonable number of consistent responses according to our measure. 16 Despite fluctuations in general, it is worth noting the strong decline in the average public consistency in 2012 in all specifications, which will be explored in the next section. 15 We only want to relax the definition of consistency, since it is not trivial to define an unquestionable specification. Inconsistency of a variable separately means that its relation to the interest rate does not follow the basic principles underlying the Taylor rule, while the other variable follows the rule. The third specification, the least restrictive, considers 13 cases of consistency among the 27 possible ones, the other 14 cases being defined as inconsistent in the sense of Taylor. As the BCB follows a strict inflation targeting regime, we define that a negative correlation between interest rates and inflation is a clearer sign of inconsistency than it is for unemployment. 16 From now on, only this specification will be used for the analyzes and estimates. The tests we use the same consistency specifications used for the consumer, this time for the monetary authority, and we take an alternative approach using the reaction function.
The application of the same measures specified above for the central bank, however, has a different interpretation since we are looking for realized data instead of expectations. Initially, we observe the variables' directions in the 6-month period.
In this case, by comparing the consumers and BCB's consistency, we are assuming that the public may be anticipating the central bank's actions, thereby incorporating a possible deviation from the Taylor rule in their forecasts, a hypothesis closer to rational expectations. On the other hand, if we analyze the direction of the variables in relation to its past, we assume that households only consider past decisions of monetary policy when forecasting, more related to adaptive expectations. The two forms are considered, i.e., the variations from t to t + 6 or to t − 6.
In the first case, the measure says that the BCB deviated from the Taylor Table 9 shows the results with the variations regarding the future of the variables. We see a significant difference in the public's consistency in these months, since the null hypothesis that consistency did not change between these periods is rejected up to 1%. This result amounts to evidence that the public changes their perceptions about monetary policy before the BCB deviates from the Taylor rule.
Thus, consumers would be anticipating changes in the monetary authority's behavior and incorporating this to future forecasts.
Nevertheless, when we analyze the past horizon, the average public's consistency in the supposed months of deviation is even higher than in other months, so the test does not reject the null hypothesis in the one-sided test. That is, if the public considers only the past when forming expectations about the future of monetary policy, a deviation from the Taylor rule before the forecast does not reduce consumer's consistency. One possible explanation for this result is that shortly Brazilian Review of Econometrics 37(2) November 2017 
after the deviations households will expect a correction of the monetary authority's behavior in the following months, like a compensation for the deviation.
Central Bank Reaction Function deviations
The disadvantage of analyzing the behavior of the central bank through these measures is that we are not taking into account the level of the variables, and then their variation around the equilibrium, an important analysis for central banks. In addition, as well as the partial effects of Carvalho and Nechio (2014) , this method does not allow us to impose a distribution structure on the data in order to make an inference.
To not just focus only on a previously defined measure and to use a more common method in the literature to evaluate the actions of the monetary authority, we will estimate a Central Bank Reaction Function as follows:
where i is the Selic target determined by the monetary authority, Etπt+12 is the expected inflation for the next 12 months, π * is the inflation target, yt−2 is the output gap and ε the error term.
As we are using monthly data in the estimation, the interest rate variable will have a strong inertia between lags by construction since it is the policy rate determined at the meetings of the Monetary Policy Committee (COPOM), which happen every 45 days. The presence of the dependent variable lagged one period among the regressors represents the hypothesis that the central bank wishes to make smooth changes in the short-term rate, so that the parameter α1 will oscillate within the interval (0,1).
The variable of expectations minus the inflation target is constructed using forecasts for inflation 12-months ahead from the Focus Survey. Later in this paper, we estimate for years prior to 2005 when the inflation target changes. Thus, we will modify the calculation of this variable according to the method used in Minella et al. (2003) 17 , which weighs the deviations according to the month in which the forecast is made.
In calculating the output gap, we will use the industrial production beacuse it's a monthly series and calculate the gap through the Hodrick-Prescott Filter. This series is delayed two months due to release dates.
We also estimate equation (2) The Table 10 shows the results of the estimation of a simple Taylor rule for the BCB from September 2005 to December 2013 and each window in the order above. As we can see, the inflation variable is not significant over the whole period, while the lagged Selic rate's coefficient shows strong interest rate inertia, due to the higher autocorrelation structure in the series. The output gap also has a significant and expected signal in the estimation.
Analyzing the results, we see that the BCB changed the orientation of monetary policy between the sub-periods. The insignificance of the output gap coefficient 17 According to the authors, the inflation expectations variable should be constructed as follows:
where Dt is the measure of expectation deviation from the target, j is the month index and t the year index. Based on these periods, we applied the same mean difference test to verify if there was a change in the public expectations between the windows. Table 11 shows the results. While in the first window there seems to be a change in the mean consistency at the 5% level of significance, in the others we do not reject the null That is, when we analyze the behavior of the BCB in moving windows, the tests amounts to evidence that there seems to be changes in the households' expectation formation only in the first window. This result indicates that changes in the monetary policy reaction to the output gap may have influenced public expectations, but the same does not occur for the period in which there seems to be a change in the response to inflation.
On the other hand, the results in Appendix A.2 show that there was a change in consumer perception in the third and fourth window when we use the median forecast instead of the IPCA to construct the categorical variable of inflation expectations.
Similarly, the estimation of the equation (1) separated in these windows, shown in Table 12 below, shows that the coefficient of inflation expectation is no Brazilian Review of Econometrics 37(2) November 2017 
longer significant in the fourth window, also indicating a more apparent change in consumer expectations in this period.
Still, despite the significant result the data shows us that the deviation periods seem to have been much more specific than the whole 40-month windows. According to Balbino, Colla and Teles (2011) , the BCB maintained the same behavior in conducting monetary policy between 1999 and 2009. Thus, the deviation from the Taylor rule observed in Table 10 seems to be more concentrated in mid-2011, when the BCB reversed a cycle of rate increases and initiated a cycle of rate cuts even with inflation rising and close to the target upper bound.
If we estimate the reaction function since 2002, a period that includes a good part of the targeting regime initiated in Arminio Fraga's term, it is evident the change of conduct in Tombini's term. In Table 13 , column (1) conducting the monetary policy adopted in previous years, the determination of the policy rate should have been narrowly more restrictive to inflationary deviations, which shows that the Tombini's term deviated from the average rule until then.
Nevertheless, this was the period that the average public consistency reached its lowest level. the beginning of the rate cuts to first month of an increase in rates. In both cases we see that there is a significant difference in the average consistency of the public in these periods, especially in the first case, where we have the most significant deviation from the Taylor rule. In addition, the estimation of equation (1) separated for these two periods of deviation also points to changes in expectations. In Table 15 we can see that the public's expectations show a signal reversal for inflation responses to interest rates in periods when the BCB is more lenient to inflation, while the unemployment effect remains with the same sign. The result is practically the same for the two deviation periods considered. In this way, consumers appear to change their perception about monetary policy in these periods and become less consistent with the Taylor rule.
As the central bank adopted a more dovish behavior until early 2013, we believe that it was the main driver for the decline in public consistency observed during this period, with a greater magnitude in 2012. Not only because of the change in monetary policy stance compared to the past, but also by disobedience to the theoretical rule of monetary policy, the BCB caused a misalignment in household's expectations during the period, which may have damaged the transmission channel and the efficiency of monetary policy. 
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Endogeneity
Possible problems of endogeneity may also arise when using the methods discussed so far. In cases where monetary shocks influence the endogenous determination of inflation and unemployment, the estimates can become biased and modify the correct causal interpretation among the variables.
Besides these shocks did not have great effects on the American case, Carvalho and Nechio (2014) argue that the bias caused did not modify the signs of the parameters considered, only the magnitude, not altering the main conclusions.
For the Brazilian case, we estimate a structural VAR (SVAR) and decompose the monetary policy shocks to verify this effect. We find that these shocks are not relevant to explain the inflation and unemployment rate dynamics in Brazil in the analyzed period. In general, monetary shocks explain approximately 2% to 4% of the inflation variance and between 2% to 3% of the variation in unemployment or the output gap in up to 12 months. When we consider market's inflation expectations as in equation (2), the monetary policy shocks explain about 10% of the variance of this variable. In this way, we can also conclude that these shocks do not alter the main conclusions of the paper.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate whether Brazilian consumers understand the conduct of 
